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Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability 
Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is 
incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument 
employs the concept of accidental necessity.1 But an opponent of this argument might challenge 
it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Trenton Merricks 
(2009, 2011) and Linda Zagzebski (2002, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. 
In this paper, I aim to show that responding to the accidental necessity version of the 
foreknowledge argument by disputing the concept of accidental necessity, including doing so in 
the ways these authors do, does not constitute a successful response to the foreknowledge 
argument. This is because there is an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of 
the foreknowledge argument which employs the notion of uncausability rather than accidental 
necessity; and this argument is not threatened by objections to the concept of accidental 
necessity, including those objections offered by Zagzebski and Merricks. As recent literature on 
the foreknowledge argument has emphasized, when a response to a foreknowledge argument 
fails to threaten an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of that argument, the 
response in question is not successful. So the responses to the accidental necessity version of the 
foreknowledge argument I have mentioned are not successful. Moreover, those working on 
foreknowledge arguments more generally should take seriously the uncausability version of the 
foreknowledge argument articulated here, as it may well be that still more responses to the 
foreknowledge argument will not threaten it, either. 
 I begin in section one by briefly presenting the accidental necessity version of the 
foreknowledge argument. In section two, I show how authors have argued that various responses 
to this argument are unsuccessful because they fail to threaten only slightly modified versions of 
the argument. In section three, I explain the response to the foreknowledge argument discussed 
above. I show in section four that there is an only slightly modified but still well-motivated 
version of the foreknowledge argument, one which employs the concept of uncausability rather 
than accidental necessity, and the no accidental necessity response does not threaten it. In the 
conclusion, I propose that even more responses to the foreknowledge argument or arguments 
much like it may well be unsuccessful for this same reason: there are only slightly modified but 
still well-motivated versions of the arguments they target which they do not threaten. In some 
cases, the argument they fail to threaten is the uncausability foreknowledge argument.  
1 The Accidental Necessity Version of the Foreknowledge Argument 
My goal in this section is to briefly present and explain the accidental necessity version of the 
foreknowledge argument RIWHQKHUHDIWHU³WKHIRUHNQRZOHGJHDUJXPHQW´. As I will present it, 
the argument is a conditional proof of the claim that if at every past time a person has infallible 
                                                          
1
 Zagzebski FDOOVWKLVYHUVLRQ³WKHVWURQJHVWYHUVLRQRIWKHIRUHNQRZOHGJHGLOHPPD´$QDOWHUQDWLYH
version, which appeals to the notion of power over the past, derives from Nelson Pike (1965).  
and exhaustive foreknowledge, then no action any creature ever performs is performed freely. 
Infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. For purposes 
of my discussion, I shall call the would-be infallible foreknower God. 
 Begin by assuming for conditional proof that at every past time God has infallible and 
exhaustive foreknowledge. I shall momentarily present an argument that, given this assumption, 
the arbitrarily chosen action of singing performed by an arbitrarily chosen creature Elizabeth at 
an arbitrarily chosen time t100 is not a free action. If this argument succeeds, then it follows that 
no creature ever performs any action freely, since Elizabeth, her act, and its time were chosen 
arbitrarily. Thus, by conditional proof, if God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge at 
every past time, then no actions by any creatures at any times are performed freely.  
 The argument that, given our assumption, (OL]DEHWK¶VDFWLRQRIVLQJLQJDWW100 is not 
performed freely begins with the following claim, where t1 is a time long before t100:  
(1) God believed at t1 that Elizabeth will sing at t100.  
Claim (1) is supposed to be justified by our assumption together with uncontroversial claims 
about knowledge. Given our assumption that God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge at 
every past time, it follows that God infallibly foreknew at t1 that Elizabeth will sing.2 But, 
knowledge that p requires believing p; so, God must have believed at t1 that Eilzabeth will sing. 
 8VLQJ³฀L´WRVLJQLI\ORJLFDOQHFHVVLW\WKHVHFRQGFODLPVD\V:  
(2) ฀L WW¶6$*RGEHOLHYHVDWWWKDW6GRHV$DWW¶ĺ6GRHV$DWW¶ 
In English, VD\VWKDWLWLVORJLFDOO\QHFHVVDU\WKDWIRUHYHU\WLPHWDQGW¶FUHDWXUH6DQG
DFWLRQ$LI*RGEHOLHYHVDWWWKDW6GRHV$DWW¶WKHQ6GRHV$DWW¶The rough idea behind claim 
LVWKDW*RG¶VLQIDOOLELOLW\HQVXUHVWKDWQHFHVVDULO\LI*RGEHOLHYHVSWKHQS7KXVZKHUHSLV
a claim that some S does A at t, necessarily if God believes S does A at t, then S does A at t.3  
 The third claim introduces the notion of aFFLGHQWDOQHFHVVLW\V\PEROL]HGDV³฀A´:KHUH
³´V\PEROL]HVDQHDUOLHU-than relation, it says:  
(3) WW¶[>[REWDLQVDWW	WW¶ĺ฀A DWW¶WKDW[REWDLQVDWW@.  
,Q(QJOLVKFODLPVWKDWIRUDOOWLPHVWDQGW¶DQGHYHQWV[LI[REWDLQVDWWDQGWLVHDUOLHUWKDQ
W¶WKHQLWLVDFFLGHQWDOO\QHFHVVDU\DWW¶WKDW[REWDLQVDWW7KLVFODLPLVRIWHQFDOOHGWKH³3ULQFLSOH
RIWKH1HFHVVLW\RIWKH3DVW´RUWKH³3ULQFLSOHRIWKH)L[LW\RIWKH3DVW´7KHNH\WR
                                                          
2
 Advocates of the Geachian view explored in (Todd 2011) may reject this way of supporting (1). For a criticism 
of 7RGG¶VVXSSRUWIRUGeachianism, see (Byerly 2012a). 
3
 I say this is the rough idea because there are some who would endorse (2) but who would reject understanding 
infallibility as implying that for any proposition p, if God believes p at t then p. Those who would do so would be 
those who think that non-time-indexed claims can change their truth-values, but time-indexed claims cannot. 
understanding (3) is to grasp that the concept of accidental necessity employed in it is a concept 
of a temporally relativized kind of necessity.4 Accidental necessity is a property that propositions 
can have at some times but not others. And, the paradigmatic cases of accidental necessity are 
FDVHVZKHUHDSURSRVLWLRQDERXWWKHSDVWLVQHFHVVDU\DWODWHUWLPHVZKHUHLWZDVQ¶WQHFHVVDU\DW
earlier times. For example, there seems to be something right about claiming that, prior to April 
15, 1865, it could have been that Lincoln was not shot, but nowadays it can no longer be that 
/LQFROQZDVQRWVKRW/LQFROQ¶VQRWKDYLQg been shot on that date is not now possible, though it 
once was possible that he not be shot on that date. Advocates of (3) claim that this is how it is for 
every claim about what obtained in the past. If x obtained at a past time t, then at future times it 
is accidentally necessary that x obtained at t.  
 We are now in a position to draw the first inference of the argument:  
(4) ฀A at t100 that God believes at t1 that Elizabeth will sing at t100.  
&ODLPIROORZVIURPDQGSURYLGHGWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHYLQJDWW1 that Elizabeth will sing at 
t100 is something that obtained at t1.5 
 The next claim of the argument is a transfer principle connecting accidental necessity and 
logical necessity: 
(5) p, q, t  [(฀A at t that p & ฀LSĺTĺ฀A at t that q].  
$JRRGQDPHIRUZRXOGEHWKH³7UDQVIHURI$FFLGHQWDO1HFHVVLW\3ULQFLSOH´7KHLGHDEHKLQG
(5) is that accidental necessity transfers across entailment. Roughly, if p is accidentally necessary 
and p entails q, then q is accidentally necessary. Support for the Transfer of Accidental Necessity 
Principle typically derives from the appeal of transfer of necessity principles for other kinds of 
necessity, such as logical necessity.  
 Given (5), (1), and (2), we can now infer:  
(6) ฀A at t100 that Elizabeth sings at t100. 
The accidental necessity at t100 RI*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIWUDQVIHUVDFURVVWKHHQWDLOPHQWIURPWKLV
EHOLHIWR(OL]DEHWK¶VVLQJLQJ7KXV(OL]DEHWK¶VVLQJLQJLWVHOILVDFFLGHQWDOO\QHFHVVDU\DWW100. 
 The final premise of the argument is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities: 
(7) S, A, t (฀A DWWWKDW6GRHV$DWWĺ6¶VGRLQJ$DWWLVQRWGRQHIUHHO\ 
                                                          
4
 See (Zagzebski 1996). 
5
 In my own view, some of the most interesting responses to foreknowledge arguments are ones which might be 
FKDULWDEO\LQWHUSUHWHGDVUHMHFWLQJWKHDVVXPSWLRQKHUHWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIRFFXUVLQWKHSDVWQRWEHFDXVHWKH\KROGWR
timelessness but because they hold that divine beliefs (or other mental states) occur only cross-temporally. See, e.g., 
(Zemach and Widerker 1987). 
I like to call (7) the principle of alternate accidental possibilities. Its support derives in part from 
the attraction of principles of alternate possibilities governing free action and responsibility more 
generally.6 
 From (6) and (7) we can now infer:   
(8) (OL]DEHWK¶VVLQJLQJat t100 is not done freely.  
With (8) we can complete our conditional proof. Given our assumption that God has exhaustive 
and infallible foreknowledge at HYHU\SDVWWLPHZHKDYHVHHQWKDWLWIROORZVWKDW(OL]DEHWK¶V
singing at t100 is not done freely. But, since Elizabeth, her singing, and t100 were all chosen 
arbitrarily, LWZLOOIROORZIURPRXUDVVXPSWLRQWKDWQRFUHDWXUH¶VDFWLRQDWDQ\WLPHLVHYHUGRne 
freely. Infallible foreknowledge and creaturely freedom are incompatible. Or so argues the 
advocate of the accidental necessity version of the foreknowledge argument. 
2 Evaluating Responses to the Foreknowledge Argument 
Even the quick presentation of the foreknowledge argument in the previous section is enough to 
show that it has considerable power. How, then, might one go about responding to it? Good 
question; but answering this question is not my primary concern here. Rather, what I am 
interested in is ways in which responses to the argument are themselves evaluated. What does it 
take for a response to the accidental necessity version of the foreknowledge argument to be 
successful?  
 One necessary condition on a successful response to the foreknowledge argument has 
been made especially clear in recent discussions. It is not enough for a response to this 
foreknowledge argument to be successful that it simply offers reason for thinking that a premise 
in the argument is false. For, there may be an only slightly modified version of the 
foreknowledge argument which this response does not threaten at all, where this modified 
version has roughly as much going for it as does the original argument. In order for a response R 
to constitute a successful response to the foreknowledge argument, it cannot be that R fails to 
threaten an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge 
argument. 
 Perhaps the clearest example of an author using this criterion of success to evaluate a 
response to WKHIRUHNQRZOHGJHDUJXPHQWLV/LQGD=DJ]HEVNL¶V(2012) recent discussion of the 
timelessness (or Boethian) solution to the foreknowledge argument. This solution responds to the 
argument by rejecting claim (1) from section one. This claim, recall, requires that God believes 
                                                          
6
 For an overview of the principle of alternate possibilities, see (Widerker and McKenna 2006).   
at t1 that Elizabeth sings at t100. The advocate of the timelessness solution claims that God is not 
in time, has no properties at any times, and so does not have any beliefs at times, including t1.7  
Zagzebski is not impressed by this timelessness solution to the foreknowledge argument. 
It is not that she thinks that divine timelessness itself is problematic. Rather, she thinks that there 
is an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge argument to 
which the timelessness solution cannot offer a response by itself. That version of the 
foreknowledge argument replaces the claims in the original foreknowledge argument which 
VSHDNRI*RG¶VKROGing beliefs at times with claims whicKVSHDNRI*RG¶VKROGLQJEHOLHIV
timelessly. Thus, for instance, (1), (2), and (3) are to be replaced with (1*), (2*), and (3*): 
(1*)  God believes timelessly that Elizabeth will sing at t100.  
(2*)  ฀L WW¶6$*RGEHOLHYHVtimelessly WKDW6GRHV$DWW¶ĺ6GRHV$DWW¶ 
(3*) t, x [(x obtains timelessly) ĺ฀A at t that x obtains timelessly)].  
These claims, together with (5) and (7) from section one, will be enough to generate the 
conclusion necessary for the foreknowledge argument. And nothing about the timelessness 
solution by itself poses any threat to these claims or to (5) or (7). Further, these claims have 
roughly as much going for them as do the parallel claims in the original argument. This is not to 
say that the resulting argument faces no problems. It is simply to say that whatever problems it 
faces are not simply the problem that it conflicts with divine timelessness. Thus, the timelessness 
response is unsuccessful, Zagzebski argues, because it does not threaten an only slightly 
modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge argument. 
 Other authors, too, have attacked the timelessness solution in similar ways.8 They have 
argued, for example, that instead of using claims about temporal divine beliefs we can use claims 
about infallible prophetic utterances or divine inscriptions. One way to understand these 
criticisms of the timelessness solution is that they are offering yet another way of showing that, 
even if the timeless view is correct, it does not constitute a successful response to the 
foreknowledge argument. The reason it does not is that there is an only slightly modified but still 
well-motivated version of that argument which is not challenged by the thesis of divine 
timelessness itself. 
 One last example of this pattern of evaluation comes from discussion of what one might 
call the divine belieflessness response to the foreknowledge argument.9 This response rejects (1) 
QRWEHFDXVHLWKROGVWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIVDUHWLPHOHVVEXWEHFDXVHLWKROGVWKDW*RGKDVQREHOLHIV
WREHJLQZLWK2QHZD\RIFULWLFL]LQJWKLVUHVSRQVHKDVEHHQWRDUJXHWKDWHYHQLI*RGGRHVQ¶W
                                                          
7
 For a recent defense, see (Rota 2010).   
8E.g., (van Inwagen 2008).   
9
 See (Alston 1986). 
have beliefs, God must have some kind of mental state whereby he knows what he knows.10 And, 
the foreknowledge argument can be revised using those mental states rather than beliefs. Again, 
this is not to say that there will not be a problem with the resulting revised argument. It is just 
that the belieflessness solution by itself is not enough. Like the timelessness solution, it is such 
that it does not threaten an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the 
foreknowledge argument. And in this way it is unsuccessful. 
3 The No Accidental Necessity Response 
In the previous section, we learned of a constraint governing successful responses to the 
foreknowledge argument. To be successful, a response must not be such that it fails to threaten 
an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge argument. My 
primary aim in this paper is to use this constraint to show that a response to the foreknowledge 
argument which casts doubt on the concept of accidental necessity is not a successful response to 
the foreknowledge argument. It is in this section and the next that I aim to demonstrate this. I 
begin in this section by explaining the no accidental necessity response.  
 Philosophers have often been tempted to respond to the foreknowledge argument by 
denying claim (3), the principle of the necessity of the past. Recall that this claim says:  
(3) WW¶[>[REWDLQVDWW	WW¶ĺ฀A DWW¶WKDW[REWDLQVDWW@ 
One approach to denying (3) is to do so because one thinks that there is at least one x such that x 
obtained DWDWLPHWDQGDWDWLPHW¶ODWHUWKDQWLWLVQRWDFFLGHQWDOO\QHFHVVDU\WKDW[REWDLQHGDWW
$GYRFDWHVRIWKLVDSSURDFKDUHRIWHQFDOOHG³2FNKDPLVWV´11  
But there is a second way of denying (3). For, one might think that there just is no such 
thing as accidental necessity. Two prominent authors on the foreknowledge debate have recently 
made comments which favor just such a response to the foreknowledge argument. And, whether 
or not these authors would ultimately affirm such an approach to the foreknowledge argument or 
affirm such an approach all by itself, the approach itself is worthy of consideration for precisely 
the reasons these authors offer for it. What I want to show in this paper, nonetheless, is that 
defending such a view is not enough for a response to the foreknowledge argument, since the 
foreknowledge argument can be restated using the concept of uncausability rather than accidental 
necessity and the restated argument will not be threatened by what these authors have said on 
behalf of this response to the foreknowledge argument. Anyone inclined to endorse the no 
accidental necessity response to the foreknowledge argument must find more to say than what 
these authors have said, and it is not clear that there is more to say.  
                                                          
10
 (Zagzebski 2011) presses this line. 
11
 E.g., see (Adams 1967). 
My first example of the no-accidental necessity response to the foreknowledge argument 
comes from Linda Zagzebski (2011)6KHZULWHV³,WLVZRUWKDVNLQJZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDQ\
VXFKWKLQJDVWKHQHFHVVLW\RIWKHSDVWDWDOO´12 And she argues that there is not any such thing. 
Nothing can fulfill the role that accidental necessity is supposed to play in the foreknowledge 
argument. ,¶OOGRP\EHVWWRUHSUHVHQWKHUDUJXPHQWKHUH 
7RXQGHUVWDQG=DJ]HEVNL¶VDUJXPHQWDEULHIFRPPHQWDERXW³XQFDXVDELOLW\´DQG
³WHPSRUDOO\DV\PPHWULFQHFHVVLW\´LVLQRUGHU7RVD\WKDWWKHSDVWLVXQFDXVDEOHLVMXVWWRVD\
WKDWIRUDQ\WLPHVWDQGW¶LIWLVHDUOLHUWKDQW¶WKHQDWW¶HYHU\HYHQWDWWLVXQFDXVDEOH²LHDWW¶
nobody can cause it. A bLWPRUHDZNZDUGO\ZHFDQWDONRIDSURSRVLWLRQS¶VEHLQJXQFDXVDEOH
when what p reports to obtain or not to obtain is uncausable in the previous sense. On the other 
hand, to say that there is a temporally asymmetric necessity is to say that there is a necessity 
which facts about the past have just because they are facts about the past, but that facts about the 
future do not have just because they are about the future. Given these explanatory comments, I 
WKLQNZHFDQIDLUO\UHSUHVHQW=DJ]HEVNL¶V argument that nothing can fulfill the role that 
accidental necessity is supposed to fulfill in the foreknowledge argument as follows:   
(9) If there is something that fulfills the role that accidental necessity is supposed to play in 
the foreknowledge argument, then it²accidental necessity²is either uncausability or it 
is temporally asymmetrical necessity.  
(10) If accidental necessity is uncausability, then the transfer of accidental necessity principle 
is false. 
(11) But part of the function of accidental necessity in the foreknowledge argument is to help 
make true the transfer of accidental necessity principle. 
(12) If accidental necessity is temporally asymmetric necessity, then the past is accidentally 
necessary just because it is past.  
(13) The past is not accidentally necessary just because it is past. 
(14) So, there is nothing that fulfills the role that accidental necessity is supposed to play in 
the foreknowledge argument. 
Let me make a few comments to defend this interpretation.  
 )LUVWLQIDYRURI=DJ]HEVNLZULWHV³,IWKHUHLVDGLVWLQFWNLQGRIQHFHVVLW\WKDWWKH
past has qua past, and which is not an implicit reference to the lack of causability of the past, 
WKHQLWLVWHPSRUDOO\DV\PPHWULFDO´7KLVLVMXVWDFRQGLWional form of the disjunction in (9).  
 In favor of (10), Zagzebski offers some powerful counterexamples to the principle which 
results from replacing accidental necessity in the transfer of accidental necessity principle with 
uncausability. Replacing accidental necessity with uncausability in that principle yields roughly:  
(15) p, q, t  [(it is uncausable at t that p & ฀LSĺTĺ it is uncausable at t that q] 
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 ,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,IROORZFORVHO\=DJ]HEVNL¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQLQKHUZKLFKKDVQRSDJHQXPEHUV 
%XWDV=DJ]HEVNLZULWHVWKLVWUDQVIHUSULQFLSOHLV³IDOVHEHFDXVHWKHWUXWKRITPD\EHDORJLFDOO\
necessary condition for the truth of p, where p is not causable but q is causable. For example, p 
might be the proposition that I build a 200 story building by myself, a proposition that is causally 
but not logically impossible. The proposition that I build a 200 story building by myself entails 
that I build a building. The proposition that I build a building (a small one, with help) is 
FDXVDEOH´7KXVLVVHFXUH6LQFHLVREYLRXVLWIROORZVWKDWXQFDXVDELOLW\FDQQRWIXOILOO
the role of accidental necessity in the foreknowledge argument. 
 But accidental necessity cannot be temporally asymmetric necessity, either. For, (12) is 
true by definition: if accidental necessity is temporally asymmetric necessity, then the past must 
be necessary just because it is past. But, Zagzebski argues in favor of (13)²that the past is not 
accidentally necessary just EHFDXVHLWLVSDVW,QIDYRURIWKLVVKHVD\V³:KDWGRZHPHDQZKHQ
we say that the past, the strict past, is necessary":KHQSHRSOHVD\µThere is no use crying over 
VSLOOHGPLON¶ they presumably mean that there is nothing anybody can do now about the spilled 
milk; the spilling of the milk is outside of the realm of our causal control. But, it is not at all clear 
that pastness per se puts something RXWVLGHWKHUHDOPRIRXUFDXVDOFRQWURO´,IWKHSDVWLV
³QHFHVVDU\´LQWKHVHQVHWKDWDFFLGHQWDOQHFHVVLW\LVVXSSRVHGWRFDSWXUHWKHQLWLVnot the case 
that the past is necessary just because it is past. But, if accidental necessity were temporally 
asymmetrical necessity, the past would be necessary just because it is past. So, accidental 
necessity cannot be temporally asymmetric necessity. 
 The foregoing LVDFKDULWDEOHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI=DJ]HEVNL¶VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRI
accidental necessity. By rejecting this notion, she rejects the principle of the necessity of the past 
in the foreknowledge argument. What I want to show in section four below is that her doing so 
does not constitute a successful response to the foreknowledge argument, because there is an 
only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the argument which will not be 
threatened by anything in her argument above. 
 Before showing how that modified version of the foreknowledge argument goes, 
however, I want to offer one more example of this same kind of response to the foreknowledge 
argument²the response which denies that there is anything such as accidental necessity. Trenton 
Merricks (2009, 2011a), too, speaks favorably of such an approach.      
 0HUULFNV¶VSUR[LPDWHWDUJHWis fatalistic arguments (arguments for the conclusion that 
nobody has any choice about anything) which begin with a premise of the form  
(16) Person S has no choice about X. 
What goes for X in (16) is either a claim that some proposition about what S will do was true in 
the distant past or a claim that God believed some proposition about what S will do in the distant 
past.  
 Merricks argues that fatalistic arguments that begin with a premise with the form of (16) 
without arguing for this premise beg the question. But, he acknowledges that most fatalistic 
arguments do not just begin with a premise with the form of (16); rather, most fatalistic 
arguments appeal to some kind of claim about accidental necessity or the fixity of the past and 
use this claim to support their premise of the form (16). He is happy to grant that such arguments 
do not beg the question. He does, however, have a different criticism of such arguments. 
 0HUULFNVVD\VWKDW³WKHZD\VLQZKLFKWKHSDVWLVSODXVLEO\µQHFHVVDU\¶IDLOWRJLYHXVD
UHDVRQWRVD\WKDWQRRQHQRZKDVDFKRLFHDERXWZKDWWKHSDVWZDVOLNH´+H
considers three ways in which the past plausibly is necessary. It is necessary in that it is such that 
nobody now has a choice about it. It is necessary in that nobody can change it. And, it is 
necessary in that events in the past cannot be caused. But that the past is necessary in any of 
these ways, Merricks insists, does not give us a reason to think that nobody has any choice about 
what the past was like. More specifically and more importantly in the present context, it does not 
supply a reason to think that nobody has any choice about what God believed in the past. And if 
it does not, then the no accidental necessity strategy is supported. For, one of the functions that 
accidental necessity is supposed to play in the foreknowledge argument is it is supposed to 
VXSSRUWWKHFODLPWKDWLI6¶VGRLQJ$DWWLVDFFLGHQWDOO\QHFHVVDU\DWWWKHQ6¶VGRLQJ$DWWLVQRW
done freely. This claim is arguably based on the more general idea that the realm of the 
accidentally necessary is beyond the grip of our free exercise. Thus, if we identify freedom with 
having a choice, as Merricks is happy to do, then it will follow that one of the functions of 
accidental necessity is that it is supposed to support the claim that nobody has a choice about 
what is accidentally necessary. Accordingly, if the only plausible ways in which the past is 
accidentally necessary fail to deliver the result that no one now has a choice about the past, as 
Merricks contends, then there is no plausible way in which the past is accidentally necessary 
which fulfills the function that accidental necessity is supposed to fulfill. In other words, the no 
accidental necessity response is vindicated. 
 Why does Merricks say that none of the three plausible ways in which the past might be 
accidentally necessary provides a reason for thinking that nobody has a choice about the past? 
The first two cases are simple. That the past is accidentally necessary in the sense that nobody 
KDVDFKRLFHDERXWLWGRHVQ¶WSURYLGHDUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKoice about the 
past²VLQFHWKHFODLPWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKRLFHDERXWWKHSDVW³FDQQRWEHDUHDVRQIRULWVHOI 
(2009: 40)´$QGWKDWWKHSDVWLVDFFLGHQWDOO\QHFHVVDU\LQWKHVHQVHWKDWQRERGy can change it 
does not provide a reason to think that nobody has a choice about it, since nobody can change the 
IXWXUHEXWWKLVGRHVQ¶WVXSSO\DUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKRLFHDERXWWKHIXWXUH 
The third case, that of uncausability, is more complicated and it takes us straight to the heart of 
0HUULFNV¶VODUger attack on fatalistic arguments. For, it presumes the success of an important part 
of that attack. 
 As with the first two approaches to identifying accidental necessity, Merricks argues that 
if accidental necessity is uncausability, then WKHSDVW¶VEHLQg accidentally necessary provides no 
UHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVHe defends this claim by 
DUJXLQJWKDWDSHUVRQFDQKDYHDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVZLWKRXWFDXVLQJWKHP+LV
argument for this can be stated simply, as follows. Suppose Jones sits at t. And suppose that at a 
time t0 a thousand years before t God believes that Jones will sit at t. Merricks proposes that 
Jones FDQKDYHDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t since Jones has a choice 
DERXWWKDWRQZKLFK*RG¶VEHOLHIGHSHQGs²namely, Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW%XWLIWKLVLVKRZJones 
KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0, then Jones QHHGQ¶WFDXVH*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0. So, the fact that 
the past is accidentally necessary in the sense that it is uncausable does not provide a reason to 
WKLQNWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIV,QGHHGWKHUHLVQRSODXVLEOHDFFRXQWRI
DFFLGHQWDOQHFHVVLW\DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHSDVW¶VEHLQJDFFLGHntally necessary provides a reason 
to tKLQNWKDWQRERG\KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHQRDFFLGHQWDO
necessity response is vindicated. 
 ,ZDQWWRFORVHWKLVVHFWLRQE\HPSKDVL]LQJWKDW=DJ]HEVNL¶VDQG0HUULFNV¶VDSSURDFKHV
to advocating the no accidental necessity reVSRQVHWRWKHIRUHNQRZOHGJHDUJXPHQWQHHGQ¶WEH
appropriated by everyone interested in that response. Their own defenses of the strategy differ 
significantly, especially when it comes to ruling out the option of identifying accidental necessity 
with uncausability. My main goal in this paper is simply to argue that someone who objects to 
the notion of accidental necessity, no matter how plausibly, has not thereby offered a successful 
response to the foreknowledge argument. I complete my argument for this claim in the next 
section by showing that there is an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the 
foreknowledge argument which will not be threatened by the fact that there is no such thing as 
accidental necessity. But, I intend for my argument to catch Zagzebski and Merricks just as well 
as someone who objects to accidental necessity for some other reason. So, I will argue in the 
next section in particular that their comments in favor of the no accidental necessity response do 
not successfully threaten the version of the foreknowledge argument I develop. A successful 
response to the foreknowledge argument calls for more. 
4 The Uncausability Foreknowledge Argument 
,¶OOEHJLQWKLVVHFWLRQE\SUHVHQWLQJP\XQFDXVDELOLW\YHUVLRQRIWKHIRUHNQRZOedge argument. It 
should be quite clear that the bare fact that there is no such thing as accidental necessity, if that is 
a fact, does not threaten the argument. This is simply because the notion of accidental necessity 
is nowhere employed in the argument. After presenting the argument, I will argue in addition 
WKDWQHLWKHU=DJ]HEVNL¶VQRU0HUULFNV¶Vremarks in favor of the no accidental necessity response 
to the accidental necessity foreknowledge argument provide a sufficient reason for rejecting the 
uncausability foreknowledge argument. 
 The key differences between the accidental necessity foreknowledge argument and my 
uncausability foreknowledge argument are in what the arguments claim about the nature of the 
past, the entailment principles used in these arguments, and what the arguments claim about the 
nature of free action. Whereas the accidental necessity argument claims that the past is 
accidentally necessary, the uncausability foreknowledge argument claims that the past is 
uncausable. Whereas the accidental necessity argument employs a transfer of accidental 
necessity principle, the uncausability argument employs a removal of causabilities principle. 
And, whereas the accidental necessity argument claims that free action requires alternate 
accidental possibilities, the uncasability argument claims that alternate causabilities are 
necessary for free action. The remainder of the arguments is the same. 
 Where ³฀C´ symbolizes it is uncausable that, we can present the uncausability 
foreknowledge argument as follows:  
(1) God believed at t1 that Elizabeth will sing at t100.  
(2) ฀L WW¶6$*RGEHOLHYHVDWWWKDW6GRHV$DWW¶ĺ6GRHV$DWW¶ 
(3*) WW¶[>[REWDLQVDWW	WW¶ ĺ฀C DWW¶WKDW[REWDLQVDWW@ 
(4) ฀C at t100 that God believes at t1 that Elizabeth will sing at t100. (1,3) 
(5*) [\WW¶W¶¶>[REWDLQVDWW	฀C DWW¶[REWDLQVDWW	฀L(x obtains at t  y obtains at 
W¶¶ ฀C DWW¶~(\REWDLQVDWW¶¶)]. 
(6) ฀C at t100 that Elizabeth does other than sing at t100. (1,2,4,5) 
(7*) S, A, t (฀C at t (S does other than A)  S does not do A freely at t). 
(8) Elizabeth does not sing freely at t100. (6,7) 
Since Elizabeth, her singing, and t100 are all chosen arbitrarily, the argument can go to show that 
if God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge, then no creature ever performs any action 
freely. ,¶OORIIHUVRPHEULHIFRPPHQWVDERXWWKHXQLTXHSUHPLVHVRIWKHDUJXPHQW 
 The first unique premise is (3*), what we might call the uncausability of the past. The 
kinds of motivations which motivate the accidental necessity of the past tend to motivate the 
uncausability of the past as much if not more, as we have already said. Both Merricks and 
Zagzebski take seriously the idea that accidental necessity just is uncausability; and this can be 
seen as evidence in favor of (3*). 
 The second unique premise is (5*), what we might call the principle of the removal of 
FDXVDELOLWLHV,Q(QJOLVKWKLVSUHPLVHVD\VWKDWIRUDOOHYHQWV[DQG\DOOWLPHVWW¶DQGW¶¶LI[
REWDLQVDWWDQGLWLVXQFDXVDEOHDWW¶WKDW[REWDLQVDWWDQGQHFHVVDULO\LI[REWDLQVDWWWKHQ\
REWDLQVDWW¶¶WKHQLWLVXQFDXVDEOHDWW¶WKDWLWQRWEHWKHFDVHWKDW\REWDLQVDWW¶¶7KHLQWXLWLYH
idea here is that when an event is the consequence of events over which we have no causal 
control, we cannot cause anything other than that event to occur. In this way, (5*) is closely akin 
to the Beta principles often used in presentations of consequence-style arguments for 
incompatibilism about free will and causal determinism.13 Those principles too are based on the 
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 )RUDUHYLHZRIVXFKSULQFLSOHVVHH2¶&RQQRU 
idea that the consequences of what is beyond our control are also beyond our control. Where we 
spell out control as it often is in the presentation of consequence-style arguments as a kind of 
two-way power, this idea is extremely close to (5*). For, one way to understand this two-way 
power is just two-way causability.14 And it is precisely such two-way causability which (5*) says 
we lack with respect to events which are the consequence of what is uncausable. Thus, to the 
extent that Beta-type principles are plausible, (5*) has much to be said in its favor. 
 And so does (7*). At least, given the plausibility of (7), (7*) has much going for it. For, 
what is it for an agent to be able to do otherwise if not for her to be able to cause something else 
to occur? It is true that certain incompatibilists, those who are adherents of a non-causal theory 
of free action, may not be as attracted to (7*) as to (7).15 For, they will say that to be able to do 
otherwise has nothing to do with being able to cause anything. I am not a fan of this theory of 
free action myself, for reasons offered by O¶&RQQRUDQG-DFREV). But, I will not go into 
this here. I will only say that to adopt a non-causal theory of free action is surely something over 
and above disputing the notion of accidental necessity. And it is certainly not something said by 
Zagzebski or Merricks in their comments favoring the no accidental necessity response. Thus, 
this sort of move would only prove my point here that the no accidental necessity response to the 
foreknowledge argument is incomplete.    
 With (3*), (5*), and (7*) in place, the uncausability argument trots on just as well as the 
accidental necessity argument. And it should be perfectly clear that the bare fact that there is no 
such thing as accidental necessity does not threaten this argument. For, it says not a word of 
accidental necessity. Further, as I shall now argue, the argument is not shown to fail by anything 
Zagzebski or Merricks defend in the course of their advocacy of the no accidental necessity 
response. 
 7DNH=DJ]HEVNL¶VGHIHQVHRIWKH no accidental necessity response first. In defense of the 
claim that nothing can play the role that accidental necessity plays in the foreknowledge 
argument, Zagzebski offers critical comments about two modalities²a temporally asymmetric 
modality and the modality of uncausability.  
 =DJ]HEVNL¶VFULWLFDOUHPDUNVDERXWWHPSRUDOO\DV\PPHWULFPRGDOLWLHVZLOOSRVHQRWKUHDW
to the uncausability foreknowledge argument. This is because it is no part of this argument that 
there is any such modality. Nor will ZagzeEVNL¶VFULWLFDOUHPDUNVDERXWXQFDXVDELOLW\SRVHD
threat to the uncausability foreknowledge argument. For, what Zagzebski claims about 
uncausability is just that it cannot be used as a substitute for accidental necessity in the principle 
of the transitivity of accidental necessity. In other words, she disputes the claim that if p is 
uncausable and p entails q, then q is uncausable. But, perspicuously, the uncausability argument 
above does not employ such a transfer of uncausability principle. Rather, it employs a removal of 
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 For a reflection on two-way power and causation in this vein, see (Lowe 2013).  
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 See, e.g., (McCann 2012) and (Goetz 2000).  
causabilities principle. And, this principle is not threatened by the counterexamples Zagzebski 
proposes against the transfer of uncausability principle. 
 0HUULFNV¶VFRPPHQWVKDYHDPRUHVLJQLILFDQWFKDQFHRIWKUHDWHQLQJWKHXQFDXVDELOLWy 
argument. For, he argues against a claim which is plausibly entailed by what I said above on 
behalf of claim (7*) of the uncausability argument. Specifically, he argues against the following 
FODLPWKHSDVW¶VEHLQJXQFDXVDEOH supplies a good reason for thinking that persons do not have a 
FKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIV7KLVFODLP is arguably entailed by what I said on behalf of 
premise (7*). For, suppose that the past is uncausable (i.e., that (3*) is true). And suppose that 
God has past beliefs about what persons will do (e.g., suppose that (1) is true). It follows that 
*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVDUHXQFDXVDEOH%XWQRZLQGHIHQVHRIFODLP,VDLGWKDWWKLVFODLPZDV
justified in part by the idea that uncausable events are beyond our control²WKDWZHDUHQ¶WDEOHWR
exercise control over what is uncausable. Thus, it follows that if the past is uncausable, then 
*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVDUHEH\RQGRXUFRQWURO²i.e., we have no choice about them. Insofar as 
commitment to the soundness of this argument implies commitment to the claim that WKHSDVW¶V
being uncausable supplies a good reason for thinking that persons do not have a choice about 
*RG¶VEHOLHIV0HUULFNV¶VDUJXLQJDJDLQVWWKLVODWWHUFODLPSRVHVDWKUHDWWRWKHDGYRFDWHRIWKH
uncausability argument. 
 Thankfully, however, what Merricks says against the claim that the past¶s being 
XQFDXVDEOHVXSSOLHVDJRRGUHDVRQIRUWKLQNLQJWKDWSHUVRQVGRQRWKDYHDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶V
past beliefs is quite unconvincing. In section three, we saw that Merricks argues against this 
FODLPE\DUJXLQJWKDWDSHUVRQFDQKDYHDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVZLWKRXWWKHUHEHLQJ
any backward causation. +HDUJXHVILUVWDVIROORZVWKDWDSHUVRQFDQKDYHDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶V
past beliefs: 
(17) Jones has a choice about Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW 
(18) *RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends upon Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW 
(19) ,I6KDVDFKRLFHDERXWWKDWRQZKLFK*RG¶s belief b depends, then S has a choice about 
*RG¶VEHOLHIE 
(20) So, Jones KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWt0 that Jones will sit at t. 
Merricks then argues that the way in which Jones KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIVKHUHGRHV
not require backward causation. 
 ,REMHFWWKDW0HUULFNV¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWJones KDVDFKRLFHDERXW*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHILVQRW
sufficiently well-defended, insofar as it is defended at all. For, Merricks either says nothing in 
GHIHQVHRIWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWRU
what he says on its behalf is unconvincing. 
 ,QVRIDUDV0HUULFNVVD\VVRPHWKLQJRQEHKDOIRIWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that 
Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWLWLVWKHIROORZLQJ16:  
My objection to [the foreknowledge argument] builds on an idea that goes back at least to 
2ULJHQZKRVD\VµLWZLOOQRWEHEHFDXVH*RGNQRZVWKDWDQHYHQWZLOORFFXUWKDWLW
happens; but, because something is going to take place it is known by God before it 
KDSSHQV¶6LPLODUO\,VD\WKDW*RGKDVFHUWDLn beliefs about the world because of how the 
world is, was, or will be²and not vice versa. For example, God believes that there are 
no white ravens because there are no white ravens, and not the other way around. And 
God believed, a thousand years ago, that Jones sits at t because Jones will sit at t, and not 
the other way around (2009: 52). 
I see three ways to interpret the passage. But none will supply an adequate defense of the claim 
WKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶Vsitting at t. 
 On the first reading of the passage, Merricks is simply voicing his agreement with 
2ULJHQ7KHSDVVDJHVKRXOGEHUHDGDVIROORZV³2ULJHQVD\VS$QGVRGR,´,IZHWDNHWKH
passage in this way, and it is not clear that we should not, then Merricks is not intending to offer 
DGHIHQVHRIWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW
He is just saying that he (and Origen) thinks this is true. Of course, that is not an adequate 
defense of the claim. So, on this interpretation, Merricks has not provided an adequate defense of 
a claim in his argument which would threaten the uncausability foreknowledge argument. And 
this claim, as we will see momentarily, is certainly in need of a defense. 
 On the secoQGUHDGLQJ0HUULFNVLVRIIHULQJDQDUJXPHQWIURPDXWKRULW\³2ULJHQVD\VS
6RS´%XWZKLOHWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZLOOSURYLGHDGHIHQVHRIWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that 
Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWLWZLOOQRWSURYLGHDQadequate defense. The 
same kind of argument from authority could be championed by advocates of any number of 
responses to the foreknowledge argument, and the defender of the foreknowledge argument will 
hardly be impressed. 
 The final interpretation is to tDNH0HUULFNVDVRIIHULQJDGHIHQVHRIWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶V
belief at t0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWLQWKHIRUPRIDGLVMXQFWLYH
syllogism, as follows:  
(21) (LWKHU*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWRUJones¶V
VLWWLQJDWWGHSHQGVRQ*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t. 
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 )RUVLPSOLFLW\¶VVDNHKHUH,RYHUORRNDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWDUJXPHQW0HUULFNVRIIHUVIRUWKHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQRQ
p.54 which makes a similar mistake as that made by the argument discussed in the main text. The alternative 
DUJXPHQWGHSHQGVRQWKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on the truth at t0 of the 
proposition <Jones will sit at t>. This claim is no more adequately defended than is the claim discussed in the main 
WH[WWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 WKDW-RQHVZLOOVLWDWWGHSHQGVRQ-RQHV¶VVLWWLQJDWW 
(22) It is not the case that Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWWGHSHQGVRQ*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit 
at t. 
(23) 6R*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 that Jones will sit at t depends on Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW 
Here we get a defense of the central claim in need of defense. And it is an argumentative defense 
that is more than an argument from authority. Unfortunately, it commits the fallacy of a false 
dilemma.17 For, there are other options beVLGHV*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 GHSHQGLQJRQ-RQHV¶VVLWWLQJDWW
DQG-RQHV¶VVLWWLQJDWWGHSHQGLQJRQ*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0; and some of these options have figured 
saliently into historical and contemporary discussions of the foreknowledge argument.18 In 
particular, there is the option according to which both *RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 and Jones¶VVLWWLQJDWW
depend on something about the world at t0 RWKHUWKDQ*RG¶VEHOLHILWVHOI. 
 What could it be about the world at t0 XSRQZKLFKERWK*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 and Jones¶V
sitting at t could depend? Perhaps the best candidate here is total facts about the spatiotemporal 
world at t0 together with the laws governing that world. Or perhaps it is, to borrow a phrase from 
Merricks (2011b) KLPVHOIWKHZRUOG¶V³subjunctive aspect´ at t0 of being such that were Jones to 
encounter the circumstances which will in fact precede his sitting, he would sit together with 
*RG¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQat t0 to bring those circumstances about. Or perhaps it is something else 
still. Regardless of what exactly it might be, this entire category of options has been overlooked 
LQ0HUULFNV¶VGLVFXVVLRQ7KDWis quite a false dilemma indeed! So, what Merricks says in 
defense of the no accidental necessity strategy is insufficient to threaten the uncausability 
argument. Worse still (though this is not my central interest here), ZKDWZH¶YHVHHQKHUHLVWKDW
0HUULFNV¶VODUJHUSURMHFWZKHQLWFRPHVWRWKHIRUHNQRwledge argument is in significant 
jeopardy.  And this is not because, as Fischer and Tognazzini (forthcoming) have maintained, 
0HUULFNV¶VKHOSLQJKLPVHOIWRWKHFODLPWKDW-RQHVKDVDFKRLFHDERXWKLVVLWWLQJDWWLV
problematic.19 Rather, it is because of his completely inadequate defense of a claim these authors 
PLVWDNHQO\VD\³VHHP>V@MXVWILQH´²WKHFODLPWKDW*RG¶VEHOLHIDWW0 GHSHQGVRQ-RQHV¶V
sitting at t. 
 Let me briefly summarize the take-away for this section and the main lesson I hope this 
paper teaches us. The uncausability foreknowledge argument is an only slightly modified but still 
well-motivated version of the accidental necessity foreknowledge argument. But, a bare rejection 
of the notion of accidental necessity will not threaten the uncausability foreknowledge argument. 
Nor will the comments made by Zagzebski and Merricks in their support of the accidental 
necessity strategy threaten the uncausability foreknowledge argument. Thus, there is good reason 
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 For my part, ,WKLQN)LVFKHUDQG7RJQD]]LQLRYHUORRNDQRWKHUFKDULWDEOHUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI0HUULFNV¶VDUJXPHQW
according to which it is not rhetorically infelicitous. Rather than thinking of Merricks as responding to an argument 
for fatalism, see Merricks as responding to an argument for the incompatibility of foreknowledge and freedom. If we 
WKLQNRI0HUULFNV¶VZRUNLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKHQKLVKHOSLQJKLPVHOIWRWKHFODLPWKDW-RQHVKDVDFKRLFHDERXWKLV
sitting is not ipso facto rhetorically problematic. 
to think that the no accidental necessity response to the accidental necessity foreknowledge 
argument is unsuccessful, given the standard for successful responses to the foreknowledge 
argument explained in section two. Furthermore, given that the uncausability foreknowledge 
argument is well-motivated, it should be of general interest to philosophers working on the topic 
of freedom and foreknowledge. 
5 Evaluating Other Responses to Foreknowledge Arguments 
Part of what has motivated my interest in the present project is the general criterion of success on 
responses to foreknowledge arguments discussed in section two. According to that criterion, a 
response to a foreknowledge argument is not successful if there is an only slightly modified but 
still well-motivated version of that foreknowledge argument which is not threatened by the 
UHVSRQVHLQTXHVWLRQ:H¶YHVHHQVRIDUWKDW%RHWKLDQLHWLPHOHVVQHVVVROXWLRQVEHOLHIOHVVQHVV
solutions, and accidental necessity solutions to the foreknowledge argument arguably run afoul 
of this criterion. We might ask whether there are further responses that do as well. In this 
concluding section, I briefly explain how one might argue that more paradigmatic Ockhamist 
responses, so-FDOOHG³0ROLQLVW´UHVSRQVHVDQG$XJXVWLQLDQUHVSRQVHVWRIRUHNQRZOHGJH
arguments are also unsuccessful, given the criterion in question. 
 Take first more paradigmatic Ockhamist responses. These responses object to whatever 
claim is used in a foreknowledge argument to express the principle of the necessity of the past or 
the principle of the fixity of the past. And, they do so by proposing counterexamples to these 
SULQFLSOHVDQGDUJXLQJWKDWWKHSULQFLSOHVGRQRWDSSO\WR*RG¶VSDVWEHOLHIV&DQRne argue that 
there are only slightly modified but still well-motivated versions of the foreknowledge arguments 
targeted by these paradigmatic Ockhamist responses which are not threatened by what 
Ockhamists say against these principles? Perhaps so. Indeed, it is not implausible that the 
uncausability argument articulated in this paper provides an example. However plausible it may 
be to claim that past divine beliefs are not accidentally necessary or not fixed, it will arguably be 
less plausible that past divine beliefs are causable. Ockhamists may even explicitly grant that 
they are not.20 But, if so, then such Ockhamists will need something besides their Ockhamism to 
have a successful response to the foreknowledge arguments they target, given the availability of 
the uncausability foreknowledge argument above. 
 Move to so-FDOOHG³0ROLQLVW´UHVSRQVHV7KRXJK³0ROLQLVP´LVEHVWUHVHUYHGDVWKHQDPH
for a particular view about the mechanics of divine foreknowledge and providence,21 it is 
sometimes (and not entirely unfelicitously) used to name a response to foreknowledge arguments 
which challenges the transfer of necessity principle within them.22 It is far from clear that what is 
said on behalf of these responses will threaten versions of the foreknowledge argument like the 
                                                          
20
 See, e.g., (Plantinga 1986). 
21
 As, e.g., in (Flint 1998). 
22
 See, e.g., (Warfield 2010), (Byerly 2011) and (Jäger 2012) 
uncausability foreknowledge argument which do not employ such transfer principles. Thus, 
DJDLQWKHUHLVUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWWKHVH³0ROLQLVW´UHVSRQVHVWRRPD\ZHOOQRWEHVXFFHVVIXOE\
our criterion. 
 Finally, there is good reason to think that Augustinian responses to foreknowledge 
arguments are not successful, given our criterion. These responses tend to target the principle in 
foreknowledge arguments corresponding to the principle of alternate possibilities. As advocates 
of the Augustinian response will point out, there are some powerful arguments that the principle 
of alternate possibilities fails.23 ,WFDQEHWKHFDVHWKDW6GRHV$IUHHO\HYHQLI6FRXOGQ¶WKDYHQRW
done A. These responses to the foreknowledge argument are problematic if they are wielded by 
the hands of libertarians about free will, however, as they sometimes are.24 For, while there are 
OLEHUWDULDQVZKRWKLQNWKDW6FDQIUHHO\GR$WKRXJK6FRXOGQ¶WKDYHQRWGRQH$WKHUHDUHQRW
libertarians who think that S can freely do A WKRXJK6FRXOGQ¶WKDYHGRQHDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQ$
in precisely the way that S did.25 But, foreknowledge arguments like those discussed in this 
paper can be reformulated to show that if God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge, then 
no person could have done anything other than to do what she did in exactly the way that she did 
it. For, besides knowing what we will do, a God with exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge 
also knows in exactly what way we will do what we will do.  
 There is reason, then, to think that objections to the foreknowledge argument which 
challenge the likes of premises (1), (3), (5), and (7) are each unsuccessful because they run afoul 
of the criterion of success presumed throughout this paper. Said a bit differently, there is reason 
to think that Boethian, Ockhamist, Molinist, and Augustinian responses to the foreknowledge 
argument are all unsuccessful given the constraint on success discussed in section two.  
One might begin to wonder at this point, if one had not already begun to do so, whether 
there are any successful responses to the foreknowledge argument. I say tKDW¶VDJRRGWKLQJ to 
wonder about. 
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